![]() We thank Nurzanty Khadijah, Chaerudin Kodir, Lina Marliani, Purwanto Nugroho, Hector Salazar Salame, and Freida Siregar for their outstanding work implementing the project and Alyssa Lawther, Gabriel Kreindler, Wayne Sandholtz, He Yang, Gabriel Zucker for excellent research assistance. This project was a collaboration involving many people. In short, increased transparency empowered citizens to reduce leakages and improve program functioning. Additional public information increased higher-order knowledge about eligibility, leading to a 16 percent increase in subsidy compared to just distributing cards. Experimentally adding the official price to the cards increased the subsidy by 21 percent compared to cards without price information. The evidence suggests that this effect is driven by citizen bargaining with local officials. ![]() Ineligible households received no less, so this represents lower leakage. Beneficiaries received 26 percent more subsidy in card villages. In a large-scale field experiment, we test whether mailing cards with program information to beneficiaries increases their subsidy from a subsidized rice program. Transportation Economics in the 21st CenturyĬan governments improve aid programs by providing information to beneficiaries? In our model, information can change how much aid citizens receive as they bargain with local officials who implement national programs.Training Program in Aging and Health Economics.The Roybal Center for Behavior Change in Health. ![]() Retirement and Disability Research Center.Measuring the Clinical and Economic Outcomes Associated with Delivery Systems.Improving Health Outcomes for an Aging Population.Early Indicators of Later Work Levels, Disease and Death.Conference on Research in Income and Wealth.Boosting Grant Applications from Faculty at MSIs.Productivity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship.International Finance and Macroeconomics.We discuss how alternative targeting approaches, such as community-targeting and self-targeting, can be used to further improve targeting in some situations. On the other hand, targeted transfers do lead to more horizontal equity violations, and do create an implied tax on consumption in the region where benefits are phased out. The results suggest that, despite the imperfections in targeting using proxy-means tests, targeted transfers may result in substantially higher welfare gains than universal programs, because for a given total budget they deliver much higher transfers to the poor. We then analyze data from two countries, Indonesia and Peru, to document the tradeoffs involved. We start by discussing how the fact that most households in poor countries do not pay income taxes changes how we conceptually think about Universal Basic Incomes. This paper examines the potential tradeoffs between targeting these transfers towards low income households versus providing universal cash transfers, also known as a Universal Basic Income. Transportation Economics in the 21st Centuryĭeveloping country governments are increasingly implementing cash assistance programs to combat poverty and inequality. ![]()
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